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COMMENT ON RECENT CASES
-Porto Rico and Hawaii to enact similar statutes. Congress also
enacted such a statute for the District of Columbia and these stat-
utes were shown to be operating successfully. The National Con-
ference on Weights and Measures, the Department of Agriculture
and the Department of Commerce endorsed the principle of prohi-
bition of excess weights in bread, and the Bakers' Weekly supported
the law.16 It is apparent from this that many men who were in
better positions to know the bread trade than the members of the
Supreme Court of the United States, believed the Nebraska bread
law to be a reasonable and efficacious measure for the protection of
the public against fraud in sales of bread. Laws with such support
are not likely to unduly impose upon protesting minorities.
Not the least among the advantages in the Holmes-Brandeis
theory over others, is that it permits wider economic and sociological
experimentation among the states by giving them more latitude in
trying out and developing their own schemes for reform.
GEORGE W. GOBLE.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FoURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH AIEND-'
MENTS-EXCLUSION OF NEGROES FROM DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY ELEC-
TIONS IN TEXAS.-[U. S.] In Chandler v. Neff' the local federal
court upholds a recent Texas statute2 which makes negroes ineligible
to participate in any Democratic party primary election held in
Texas. In 1905 Texas passed a very elaborate law regulating the
making of nominations for public office and requiring them to be
made in primary elections by all parties that polled at least 100,000
votes in the last general election. Smaller parties were optionally
allowed to nominate by conventions, but the requirements for vot-
ing at both primary elections and at the convention primaries were
rigidly prescribed.3 The act of 1923, cited above, was passed as an
amendment to this general primary law, and was attacked in tht
federal district court by a bill for an injunction against its enforce-
ment by various state officials. On the authority of Giles v. Harris
4
the court dismissed the bill on the ground that courts of equity will
not enforce political rights by injunction, but, on account of its im-
portance, went on to discuss the question on its merits.
It had previously been decided in Texas, following the weight
of American authority, that a 'primary election' was not an 'election'
within the meaning of the state constitution prescribing qualifica-
tions for electors ;5 and the court cited Newberry v. United States6
as giving a similar meaning to 'election' in art. I, sec. IV of the
federal Constitution. It was then assumed that the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments applied only to the same kind of an 'elec-
16. See the notes to Mr. Justice Brandeis's dissent.
1. (1924 W. D. Tex. San Antonio D.) 298 Fed. 515.
2. Texas Gen. Laws 1923 2d Called Sess. c. 32 sec. 1-Texas Rev. Civil
Sts. art. 3093a.
3. Texas Rev. Civil Sts. 1913 arts. 3084-3174.
4. (1903) 189 U. S. 475.
5. Koy v. Schneider (1920) 110 Tex. 369, elaborately collecting and dis-
cussing the authorities.
6. (1921) 256 U. S. 232.
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tion'--tbe final choice of an officer by the duly qualified electors-
and therefore did not limit state control of 'primary elections.'
It will be noted that these assumptions are far from obvious.
The Fifteenth Amendment does not use the word 'election' at all.
It forbids the denial to citizens of the United States of the 'right
to vote' on account of race, etc. It may be urged with a good deal
of force that an 'election' technically refers only to the choice of
officials, and hence would not include voting upon local option prop-
ositions or municipal bond issues, for instance.7 In Willis v. Kaln-
bach8 it was even suggested that the Fifteenth Amendment was in-
tended to secure only the right of citizens to vote for the classes of
officers enumerated in the Fourteenth Amendment, section 2 (presi-
dential electors, members of Congress, state executive and judicial
officers, and members of state legislatures); but this has been
authoritatively denied in Myers v. Anderson,0 a case of the election
of municipal officers. The 'right to vote' may well be a wider term
than the right to vote at an 'election,' and so include, for instance,
local option submissions to the voters, and still not include voting
in party primaries, even when regulated by the state. And, of
course, the Fourteenth Amendment, section 1, in its due process and
equality clauses, is not limited to 'elections' or even to 'voting'; and
it is quite possible that it applies to political as well as civil rights.10
A party, being a voluntary association, may consist, at least
with the consent of the state, of persons more or less numerous than
the electorate and possessed of less or greater qualifications than the
electorate, at least if such qualifications have the assent of the party;
e. g., women were allowed to vote in party primaries in some states
before they were fully enfranchised. 1 A party may lawfully have
for its object, unless forbidden by statute, the election of candidates
of a certain race or religion, only, however opposed such objects
may be in general or in particular cases to the tenets of good citizen-
ship or of wise public policy. And it may, of course, voluntarily
confine its official membership to those who believe in its views, or
who belong to the favored race or religion. Now, when parties are
regulated by law, may the state, if it chooses, enforce for a party
the same rule or rules of membership that the party itself adopts,
not as necessarily indicating approval of their wisdom or propriety,
but as a recognition of their existence in fact in and for that party?
It seems difficult to deny this, provided only that the state does not
7. See Willis v. Kalmbach (1909) 109 Va. 475; State ex rel. Birchniore
v. State Bd. of Canvassers (1907) 78 S. C. 461, annotated in 14 L. R. A.(N. S.) 850.
8. See note 7.
9. (1915) 238 U. S. 368. The Nineteenth Amendment, in language simi-
lar to the Fifteenth, has been held to entitle women to vote at municipal
bond issue elections. (1921) State v. Marsh 106 Neb. 760; (1922) Stephens
v. School Dist. 153 Ga. 690.
10. Strauder v. West Virginia (1880) 100 U. S. 303 (cf.. the dissent
of Field, J.-rejected by the court-in ex parte Virginia (1880) 100 U. S.
339, 367-8) ; Pope v. Williams (1904) 193 U. S. 621, 634; Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins (1886) 118 U. S. 356, 370.
11. Koy v. Schneider (1920) 110 Tex. 369.
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hamper the free expression of contrary views by other parties. A
law forbidding negroes to vote in any party primary, or in the pri-
mary of any party which desired their membership, would probably
violate if not the Fifteenth then the Fourteenth Amendment .as a
deprivation of liberty and equality without due process; but if the
Democratic party in Texas desires to be a white party only, it seems
not unconstitutional, whether wise or not, for the state to recognize
this as an attribute of that party.
A more doubtful statute was one of Arkansas which forbade
the issuing of any license to sell liquor in any town or city unless
(1) a majority of the votes cast in the county was for licensing,
and (2) a majority of the adult white inhabitants of a town or city
therein signed a petition to the county court for §aid license. The
court was not bound to grant such petition, and anyone, including
negroes, might appear and object to its granting. This was upheld
in McClure v. Topf,1 2 on the ground it did not concern voting and
so did not violate the Fifteenth Amendment, but merely imposed a
condition upon the liquor traffic which could be absolutely prohibited
if the state desired. But the statute made it possible for whites to
secure governmental sanction of liquor selling by a procedure denied
altogether to negroes, and might well have been held a denial of the
equal protection of the laws. This has been held in several cases
where statutes purported to allow white citizens of a municipality
alone to vote taxes upon the property of its white inhabitants for
the support of white schools, the colored schools being similarly
supported by taxes imposed by negro voters upon the property of
the colored inhabitants. This was held bad as producing a grossly
unfair distribution of school tax money between the children of the
two races.' 3  JAMES PARKER HALL.
ILLINOIS CASES
APPEAL AND ERROR- CHANCERY- FINDINGS OF MASTLR IN
CHANCERY.-In Chicago Title & Trust Company v. Central Trust
Company' this language appears:
It . . . W6 have recognized the law as settled by this court in
numerous decisions that we will not disturb the findings of the master
and the court below in a case of this kind, involving an accounting and
consideration of numerous items in the accounting, unless such items
are shown to be manifestly against the weight of the evidence. This
court has plainly stated in Williams v. Lindblom, 163 Ill. 346, that the
findings of fact of a master are conclusive in such a case unless a clear
mistake or fraud are shown."
12. (1914) 112 Ark. 342, followed in Wade v. Homer (1914) 115 Ark.
250.
13. Claybrook v. Owensboro (1883 D. C. Ky.) 16 Fed. 297; Puitt v. Coin-
Missioners (1886) 94 N. C 709. Contra: Crosby v. Mayfield (1909) 133
Ky. 215.
1. (1924) 312 IM. 396 at page 518.
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